Thursday
Room 2
11:40 - 12:40
(UTC+01)
Talk (60 min)
The Past, Present, and Future of Cross-Site/Cross-Origin Request Forgery
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks have been around for more than a decade. The modern developer's toolbox contains various defenses against CSRF, including the recently introduced SameSite cookies. Unfortunately, modern defenses are often misunderstood or ineffective to cover new variations of CSRF attacks. One illustration is the rise of Cross-Origin Request Forgery attacks against API-based applications.
In this session, we explore the past, present, and future of Cross-Site and Cross-Origin Request Forgery attacks. We identify the attack pattern and the impact on the application. We explore how typical defenses mitigate the attacks, but also how their shortcomings often fail to stop all attack vectors. We also identify how API-based applications become vulnerable to CSRF attacks, along with best practice defenses for APIs. You will walk away from this session with a solid understanding of CSRF attacks, the necessary prerequisites to become vulnerable to such attacks, and best practice defenses to stop CSRF once and for all.
Philippe De Ryck
Philippe De Ryck specializes in making web security accessible to developers and architects, leveraging his Ph.D. from KU Leuven to inform his comprehensive understanding of security challenges. As the founder of Pragmatic Web Security, he provides practical security training and consulting services to organizations worldwide.
His online course platform offers a self-paced approach to learning about security. Philippe also actively helps shape OAuth 2.0 best practices as the co-author of the best practices for browser-based apps specification.
Philippe is recognized as a Google Developer Expert, acknowledging his contributions to web application and API security. He also organizes SecAppDev, an annual week-long application security course in Belgium.